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THE UTILITARIAN FOUNDATIONS
OF NATURAL LAW
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
Contemporary thinking about rights draws a sharp line be-
tween deontological and consequentialist ethical theories. De-
ontological theories are associated with the natural law
tradition as it has developed in this century, while consequen-
tialist theories may be conveniently, if inexactly, grouped as
utilitarian. The points of opposition between these approaches
have been so often rehearsed that it is only necessary to sum-
marize them briefly here. Natural rights theories regard them-
selves as theories of individual entitlement, not as theories of
social good. Their emphasis on the justice of the individual
case, the intimate connection between the doer and the sufferer
of harm, makes them overtly anti-instrumental in orientation.'
They disavow the idea that the consequences of any legal rule
could justify its adoption or rejection. Taken to its logical ex-
treme, these natural law theories have-or at least ought to
have-as their central maxim, fiatjustitia ruat coelum, let justice
be done though the heavens may fall: if consequences never
count, then disastrous consequences cannot count either.
Natural rights theories employ a terminology that often bor-
ders upon the obscure. Some special thing, property, quality or
attribute is all too often "immanent" or "inherent" in some-
thing else.2 While natural lawyers recognize the difference be-
tween analytical and empirical truths, they often strive to
identify a grand set of necessary empirical truths about human
nature that are not made, but rather are discovered through
some combination of introspection, observation, and rational
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi-
cago. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the School of Law of The Hebrew
University in Jerusalem in March, 1988, and at Vanderbilt University Law School in
November, 1988. I thank Randy Barnett, Loren Lomasky, Richard A. Posner, and
Lloyd Weinreb for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. "In the common-law world generally, tort law treats the two litigants as connected
one with the other through an immediate personal interaction as doer and sufferer of
the same harm." Weinrib, The Insurance Justiflcation and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUmD.
681, 683 (1985); see also Weinrib, Legal Formalism- On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE Li. 949 (1988).
2. "From the first, the idea of a normative order immanent in nature was a funda-
mental element of classical Greek speculation." L. WEINREB, NATuRAL LAW ANDJUSSTCE
15 (1987); see also sources cited supra note 1.
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discourse.3 The synthetic a priori of Kant is not, or at least not
obviously, an empty category for thinkers in the natural rights
tradition. The contingent and variegated elements of human
life and experience are subordinated to those elements that are
perceived as permanent, general, and inescapable, if not di-
vinely revealed.4 The study of differences in culture and laws,
first made popular by Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws,' is
viewed by them with suspicion because of its implicit attack on
the universality of the legal order whose basic intellectual sub-
strate spans the generations and crosses the seas. A couple of
sentences of Leo Strauss sum up the position:
By natural law is meant a law which determines what is right
and wrong and which has power or is valid by nature, inher-
ently, hence everywhere and always.... Natural right is that
right which has everywhere the same power and does not
owe its validity to human enactment.... Natural right thus
understood delineates the minimum conditions of political
life .... 6
No modesty here.
Notwithstanding the breadth of their claims, natural lawyers
today are often quite defensive about what they do.7 While they
pride themselves in a program that is abstract, ambitious, aus-
tere, and rigorous, they recognize that they are the devoted
champions of a minority outlook. To them, modem legal and
ethical thinking is dominated by a dreaded reliance upon cost-
benefit calculations, realism, pragmatism, instrumentalism and
social planning. Nonetheless they persevere, stoically confident
3. See, for example, J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 283-84 (1980),
which heavily emphasizes the importance of "practical reasonableness." Finnis's posi-
tion is criticized for its incompleteness in L. WEINREB, supra note 2. at 112-15.
4. "[C]lassical doctrinal legal science required a deontological theory of morality,
and... the deontological foundation of natural law was provided by the idea of the
divine will ...." N. SIMMONDs, THE DECLINE OF JURIDICAL REASON: DoCTRINE AND
THEORY IN THE LE6AL ORDER 57 (1984).
5. See C. MoNTsE.UIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone
trans. 1989) (1748).
6. L STRAUSS, On Natural Law, in STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 137,
140 (1983). Although Strauss is a unique philosopher, his position is widespread in the
natural law tradition. Thus Blackstone writes:
This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is
of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over the globe in all
countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority,
mediately or intermediately, from this original.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41. See also the passage from Gaius, at infra note
41.
7. See, e.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 3, at 120.
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that with suitable explication their necessary truths about
human and legal relations may perhaps in time become our
conventional truths as well.
Utilitarianism for its part makes light of what it regards as the
exaggerated pretensions of natural law theories. Jeremy Ben-
tham, for example, regarded himself as the mortal adversary of
the lawyer Blackstone,s so much so that natural law was in his
view not only "nonsense, but nonsense on stilts"-so as to cap-
ture the ungainliness of natural law in a derisive phrase. The
hostility towards natural law begins with the obvious point that
it is odd to "find" law "out there" like a rock or a stone, or
even as a necessary constituent of a human relationship. Laws
are something made by men for the governance of mankind.
There is a need to escape what Laurence Becker has aptly
called "the rigidity and ultimate mystery of seventeenth-cen-
tury natural rights theory."' While all utilitarians may not agree
with John Austin that law is the command of the sovereign,
-they do regard the dominant mark of law as power, not reason.
Be that as it may, there is a second truth as well. The survival of
past societies has depended heavily upon their choice of laws,
just as our survival and prosperity is heavily dependent upon
the choices, often conscious and deliberate, that are made to-
day. Utilitarianism is thus concerned not only with general
principles of right and wrong, but also with historical context
and institutional arrangements. Law is more than what is writ-
ten on the statute books.
Utilitarianism also rejects the intuitionism to which natural
lawyers gravitate. In examining this complex of legal and social
institutions that surrounds the law as such, modern consequen-
tialist theories place heavy emphasis upon the maximization of
some social good. The choice of happiness, utility, or wealth
raise important controversies within the consequentialist
school, but these divisions pale in comparison to the starker
opposition with classical theories of natural law and natural
right. If the classical philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas
and Locke lies at the root of natural law, then utilitarianism de-
8. On the rivalry, see Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569 (1976).
9. L BECKER, PROPERTY RIGms: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 4 (1977). Becker is
willing to spread the criticism around, for the sentence continues, "as well as of the
ruthlessly forward-looking concerns of utilitarian and socialist theories." Id Most so-
cialist theories do invoke some utilitarian standard, and fail because the set of institu-
tions that they envision fares poorly by any utilitarian criterion.
No. 3] 715
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pends upon the skepticism of David Hume, the economics of
Adam Smith, the indefatigable curiosity of Bentham, and the
social cost calculations of Ronald Coase.
This brief thumbnail sketch deliberately ignores or down-
plays important differences within both the natural law and util-
itarian camps. Although for some purposes those tensions
might be important, in this context they are not. Enough has
been said to indicate that apparently there is fundamental con-
flict between these two schools of Western thought that cannot
be ignored or papered over. Nonetheless I think that these con-
flicts, although often celebrated today, miss some larger truths
about the relationship between natural rights and utilitarian
tradition in Western and certainly Anglo-American thought.
Thus it is commonplace to observe that although the two
scfhools may differ radically on methodology and theoretical
structure, they often agree upon results. Both theories find a
large place for private property; both are concerned with ag-
gression and with the importance of keeping promises.
Whatever one can say about the differences between Locke and
Hume, or between Blackstone and Bentham,10 they are very
much peas from the same pod in comparison to the Marxists,
socialists, communitarians, republicans and feminists of our
day.
I believe that the correspondence in outcomes between the
classical utilitarians and their natural law rivals is not simply a
matter of coincidence, but rests upon a deep convergence be-
tween these two theories. The sense of convergence was, I
think, fairly evident in the works of the earlier natural law writ-
ers, many of whom were quite happy to make reference to gen-
eral utility in the course of their deliberations. Indeed in the
earlier writings, the utility of the rules were not the reasons for
their binding force, but were evidence of the goodness of the
divine will that made them obligatory on mankind." Often the
10. On the relationship between Blackstone and Bentham:
In short, Bentham's hostility to Blackstone seems to have been rooted less in
disagreements over substantive policies than in Blackstone's forensically effec-
tive defense of a gradualist approach to legal reform that preferred common
law interstitial lawmaking to sweeping statutory change and that emphasized
both the capacity of the common law to reform and the high incidence of
legislative miscarriage.
Posner, supra note 8, at 596.
11. The point is stressed in N. SIMMONDS, supra note 4, at 54. He quotes Pufendorf
as follows:
716 [Vol. 12
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demonstrations of the utilitarian advantages received a
subordinate place in the argument, but they are evident on
even a casual inspection of the text. Blackstone, for example,
could refer to private property as "[t]he immediate gift of the
creator,"12 in one place, but then give the standard modem
justification for private property-the internalization of gains
from private effort maximizes social output-with a clarity and
precision modern analysts would do well to emulate." The
simplest way to view the connection between the two traditions
is to understand that the utilitarian considerations have come
to dominate the analysis given the loss of faith in divine
providence.
Again, although those precepts have manifest utility, still, if they are to have
the force of law, it is necessary to presuppose that God exists, and by His
providence rules all things; also that He has enjoined upon the human race
that they observe those dictates of the reason, as laws promulgated by Himself
by means of our natural light.
l (quoting S. PuFENroRF, DE O mmo HOMiNtS Er Cxs 19 (F. Moore trans. 1927)
(1682)).
Blackstone also sounds this same consequentialist theme:
For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of
eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be
obtained but by observing the former;, and, if the former be punctually
obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter... [God] has graciously reduced the
rule of obedience to one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own
true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics,
or natural law.
1 W. BLACKsroN, COMMENTARIES *40-41. Blackstone of course did not reckon on the
complications of collective choice.
12. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *3 ("The earth therefore, and all things
therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the
immediate gift of the creator."). Note that Blackstone reaches this conclusion because
he is aware that the customary justifications for property-receipt by grant, gift or be-
quest-fail unless the tidtle of the grantor, donor or testator can be established. He has
no strongjustification for the common law rule ofoccupancy, so he avoids the problem
by converting all property into a gift from the creator to all mankind. But he does not
explain how this title is "jointly" held, how severance takes place, and why the title
vests in mankind "exclusive of other beings."
13. But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became nec-
essary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion; and to appro-
priate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the
thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the
good order of the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a vari-
ety of persons were striving to get the first occupation of the same thing, or
disputing which of them had actually gained it. As human life also grew more
and more refined, abundance of conveniences were devised to render it more
easy, commodious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and safety, and
raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to pro-
vide either, so long as he had only an usufructuary property in them, which
was to cease the instant that he quitted possession;- if, as soon as he walked
out of his tent, or pulled offhis garment, the next stranger who came by would
have a right to inhabit the one, and to wear the other.
Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
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Despite the possibility of this easy transition from classical
natural law to modern utilitarianism, the convergence between
the two traditions has disappeared in our own time. But when
understood correctly, the two traditions are very closely allied.
This essay is devoted to exploring those common elements in
order to effectuate a reconciliation of sorts between these two
dominant traditions. That reconciliation cannot be achieved
without some cost. Here both sides have to pay part of the
price. My sense is that the natural law thinkers had a very acute
and sound sense of the basic rights that any utilitarian would
want to adopt in his society, but that their methodology, with
its heavy appeals to intuition and revelation, cannot withstand
the battering that it has received from thinkers schooled in the
utilitarian tradition.' 4
What I shall try to do, therefore, is to indicate how a proper
application of utilitarian principles generates many of the cate-
gorical conclusions that natural rights thinkers first articulated
and defended. In order to do this, one has to look more closely
at the various points of difference that separate the natural law
thinkers from their utilitarian rivals. The first section therefore
examines the question of whether the social and legal relations
between persons depend on the common features of all man-
kind or the differences that arise between different cultures.
The second section then examines the dominant legal and so-
cial institutions that arise in response to the similarities and dif-
ferences within the human condition. The third section then
looks at the way in which the categorical rules that often
emerge in private law are in fact the proper utilitarian response
when the costs of enforcement are allowed to temper the de-
mand for justice in the individual case. The fourth section then
briefly discusses the congruence between general utilitarian
principles and the state's power to take private property for
public use. A brief conclusion follows.
I.
One critical element of the natural law program is that cer-
tain conditions remain constant across apparently disparate civ-
ilizations and cultures. The motivation for this tenet seems
14. I addressed some of these themes in Epstein, The Classical Legal Tradition, 73 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 292 (1988); Discussion: The Classical Theory of Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 310
(1988).
718 [Vol. 12
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dear enough. If every culture stood on its own bottom, then it
would be impossible to generate a set of universal norms suita-
ble for all cultures. The obvious differences in social circum-
stances and local conventions would defeat the natural lawyer's
claim for universality.
The use of the word "nature" itself suggests the dominant
strategy that allows-or at least should allow-natural lawyers
to counter the threat of particularization. The obvious source
of human needs and desires is not culture, but human nature.
What is distinctively human does not depend on how persons
are socialized in this or that particular environment. It rests in
the common set of biological necessities that have shaped the
way all individuals, and indeed entire populations, have
evolved over time. It is possible to identify these natural needs,
desires, and inclinations, without retreating to a very high level
of abstraction, or to any artificial linguistic convention. There
are needs for essential amino acids to construct the proteins
necessary for life. There is need for caloric intake above certain
minimum levels to sustain basic life functions. There is need
for pregnant women to carry their infants to term; and for par-
ents to raise them to a level of reproductive maturity. There is
need for protection against cold and heat, and against disease
and predation. Any social order that ignores these imperatives
pays a very high price, perhaps the ultimate price, of extinction.
The biological anchor weighs heavily on the types of feasible
social organizations.
Back of the battle for survival is the looming threat of scar-
city. There is never enough to go round, so that conflict within
groups and across groups is an inescapable part of human
existence. It is, moreover, a condition that calls forth its own
type of human personality. Hume talked about a human condi-
tion in which there was individual self-interest and confined
generosity.15 Hume treated this generalization more as a wise
observation, and less as the consequence of any general theory.
But the logic of evolution suggests otherwise. Where resources
are scarce, disinterested generosity is not a viable strategy for
survival. The organism that unilaterally divides its possessions
with others cannot thereby force others to divide their posses-
15. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE, 495 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888)
(1739) ("'tis only from the selashness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provi-
sion nature has made for his wants, thai justice derives its origin") (emphasis in original).
No. 3] 719
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  719 1989
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
sions with him. Over time greedy organisms that have all of
what they produce, and some of what others have produced,
will tend to fare better in competition with more generous or-
ganisms who retain only a fraction of what they produce. As the
process continues, the pure altruist keeps a smaller and smaller
share of the world's stock, until the retained share is insuffi-
cient to allow survival or the reproduction of its own kind.
These evolutionary pressures did not surface first in human
beings. They are the driving force behind the evolution for all
forms of life. Whatever the manifest difference in structure,
tastes and appearances, self-interest deserves its special status
as a constant in nature. It is hardly possible that forces that
operate on all living creatures from single-cell organisms to
primates cease to be relevant in human beings. Traits that nat-
ural selection has molded for eons do not just disappear with-
out a trace. Quite the opposite holds true. Self-interest looks to
be a well-nigh universal imperative that instructs all individuals
how to manage their initial endowments, given variations in
their external environment. Self-interest is not the reason for
the Darwinian theory of natural selection. Rather, it is the nec-
essary behavioral consequence of the prolonged and remorse-
less operation of that principle. Darwin's choice of the word
"natural" is no verbal happenstance. Not only does it hint at
some tight connection between natural selection and natural
law, but it also calls to the'fore the proposition that there is no
central purpose that directs or informs the process. The whole
picture is a composite mosaic in which each organism has con-
trol over only a very small piece. There is no master or central
plan. There is only the conflict, coordination and overlap of
small and separate plans, each held by individual organisms.
What happens to the whole is a complex aggregation of the
constituent parts.
This argument is perfectly general in form, and in no way
depends upon the particular manifestations of human conduct
in any specific culture. It is not bound to time or to place. It
satisfies the stringent conditions of universalization that natural
lawyers set for their own task. But what utilitarian could reject
it as the basis of his own calculations? At a descriptive level,
these theories explain how individuals maximize their welfare
under conditions of scarcity and uncertainty. The biology to
which the natural lawyer so frequently resorts thus throws him
720 [Vol. 12
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into the deadly brace of the maximization theories that are the
hallmark of utilitarian thought.
This theory of individual self-interest is not only a theory of
conflict and competition, it is a theory of cooperation as well.
The organism that goes it alone has no insurance to fall back
upon when things go bad, and is unable to engage in any
projects that require the coordination of two or more actors.
The logic of self-interest does not ignore the gains from coop-
eration in order to maximize only those gains from competition
and aggression. It encourages voluntary arrangements with
some, and recognizes that although conflict may promise great
gains, it also holds out the possibility of devastating losses. Vol-
untary arrangements sidestep these perils, and therefore can be
stable over the long run without external enforcement if each
party to them knows (in that peculiar biological sense of "as
if") that the gains from a short-term defection are smaller than
the gains from a continued long-term relationship. Given this
pattern of long term relationship, many instances of "altruism"
are "reciprocal altruism"-which, notwithstanding the phrase,
are not forms of altruism at all.1 6 An isolated act of generosity
is sometimes better understood as self-interested behavior em-
bedded in a large network of reciprocal interactions. We have
here the basis of tort (preventing aggression) and contract (en-
forcing voluntary agreements) that both coincide very well with
the theory of individual self-interest.
At this point a note of caution must be injected. The counter-
examples to the theory of individual self-interest must be taken
into account, each in their very different ways. There are count-
less instances of parents who sacrifice themselves for their chil-
dren, and, even of individuals who act to their own detriment in
order to advance the interests of strangers. Hume recognized
that point when he spoke of the confined generosity that soft-
ened the hard edges of a utilitarian theory based on scarcity
and self-interest. It is useful to see how a natural law theory
should deal with these two cases: benevolence to strangers, and
ties within the family.
16. For a general discussion, see D. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 104-36
(1977).
No. 3]
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A. Benevolence Toward Strangers
Cases of genuine heroism toward strangers cannot be ac-
counted for by the self-interest model, save by elaborate and
contrived extensions as to what self-interest means.' 7 In part
these behaviors seem to be attributable to the capacity for con-
scious reflection that people have, at least in far greater abun-
dance than other organisms. Whether in the form of risky
undertakings or charitable contributions, the willingness to
forego benefits to one's own self serves as the foundation for
much good that comes in society. The legal system, however,
does not have to trouble itself unduly with actions of benevo-
lence. If it does not prohibit them, then they will continue to
occur, and thus mediate the conflicts of interest that otherwise
arise among people.'8
The great mistake, however, would be to overestimate the
frequency and importance of these events relative to the risks
that self-interest poses to social order. The easy solution of
praising benevolence has no costless mirror image when it
comes to controlling against harms inflicted on strangers.
Quite the opposite, public and private resources do have to be
committed to this enterprise, and it is important to structure
social obligations in ways that limit the risks that unbridled self-
interest can have on the welfare of all individuals. It would be a
mistake, for example, to organize a tax system around a norm
of voluntary compliance simply because many people make ex-
tensive charitable contributions. The natural lawyer therefore
need not trouble himself unduly with these counter-examples
to unremitting individual self-interest. So long as they occur
with modest frequency in different societies, rules can be fash-
ioned to allow the behavior to go forward, and these will tend
to serve desirable utilitarian ends. If the very worst we think
about all people is not always true, then there is a cushion of
safety from which we all benefit.
17. For an exhaustive account of the point, see D. PARFrT, REASONS AND PERSONS
111-36 (1984).
18. Indeed most of the difficulties withgifts lie in the fact that transfers that appear
to be voluntary may well be subject to subtle forms of pressure or undue influence.
Unwillingness to enforce bare promises to make a gift, which is characteristic of virtu-
ally all legal systems, rests on the recognition that these pressures cannot simply be
ignored. For a discussion of the complications, see Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1 (1979).
722 [Vol. 12
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B. Altruism Within the Family
The postulate of individual self-interest is also unsuccessful
in dealing with the complex transactions within the family. Par-
ents routinely make enormous investments in their children in
the present, and their willingness to do this is not easily ex-
plained by treating that investment as though it were the front
end of a voluntary exchange, with return performance due
from the child at some later date. 9 Any such return care (by
implicit agreement, if and when I reach an old age) can usually
be provided only in the distant future, if at all. The risk of non-
performance, given imperfect enforcement, is very high, and
the present discounted value of any return performance is triv-
ial, especially with small children born of older parents. Invest-
ment in children is a poor form of old age insurance. The
perfect egotist is well-advised to avoid children-and to set up an
annuity from earnings to provide health care on a contract ba-
sis for his old age. Yet parents continue to make enormous sac-
rifices to have and to raise children. To make matters worse
parents often face anguished choices of allocating special care
to children with severe handicap, sickness, disability, and retar-
dation, both during life and after their death. In these cases,
any effort to conjure up some implicit contract of exchange
across the generations rests on the thin veneer of fiction. One
can find signs of business transactions within the family, espe-
cially after the children come of age and become partners in
the family firm. But the full range of familial behaviors offers a
deadly challenge to the uncompromising theory of individual
self-interest.
These interfamilial objections do not undermine natural law
theory by showing that there are no constants in human nature.
Quite the opposite, they reinforce the model by requiring us to
recognize the interdependent utility functions that are them-
selves the result of constant biological interactions. Through-
19. For a summary of the relevant economic literature, see Cox, Motives for Private
Income Transfers, 95 J. PoL- EcoN. 508 (1987). Cox allies himself with those who think
that the exchange model dominates the altruism model, and offers in support of that
proposition that bequests are larger to offspring with high incomes, which is consistent
with the idea that these persons have rendered services for which the bequest is in
payment. The altruist hypothesis would suggest that greater gifts would go to offspring
with lower incomes, in order to equalize wealth within the family, here on the assump-
tion of diminishing returns to additional units of wealth. His data does not include the
care and support that are given by parents prior to the maturity of their children, but
concentrates only on support that adult children give their parents.
No. 3] 723
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out nature the care that primates, and other animals as well,
give to their youngsters cannot be explained by any theory of
individual self-interest. But the behavior can be explained by
invoking the idea of inclusive fitness, whereby what is maxi-
mized is the welfare of genes, not individuals as such.20 By vir-
tue of this theory, each person takes into account the welfare of
others, discounted to reflect their fraction of common genes. In
the normal situation each parent treats the welfare of the child
as though it were one half of its own, that of a grandchild as
though it were one-fourth and so on. Under this theory what is
maximized is the expected value of the total genotype, so that
each parent will trade off one unit of cost to himself for two
units of benefit to the offspring-even if there is no prospect of
return benefit under some implicit contract. In the early stages
of child rearing, small inputs from the parent generate large
benefits to the child, so that the amount of caring behavior is
great.
The same marginal tradeoffs, moreover, are applicable to
both fathers and mothers, but that does not imply that parents
of both sexes invest the same amount in parental care. Breast
feeding is but the most conspicuous illustration of an asymme-
try in cost between mother and father. The mother is often in a
better position to provide effective, low-cost care for an infant,
so the theory suggests that she will provide more care than the
father even though their theory of genetic relatedness is the
same. Given the difference in initial endowments, the unified
theory of inclusive fitness predicts differential involvement for
males and females. Similarly the theory also explains why the
level of parental care for both mothers and fathers diminish as
a child gets older. The benefits of parental care are reduced as
the child can do more for himself, but the costs of care to the
parents are constant or increasing if only because continued
attention to living children reduces their opportunities to have
further children.2 1
The existence of children, moreover, increases the gains
20. See Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, 7J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
1 (1964).
21. The feminist proposition that women are different from men because they are
"connected" to other persons while men are not represents an oversimplification of
the basic biological theory. See, e.g., WestJurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (1988). So long as inclusive fitness applies to both men and women, both have
"connectedness" with other members of their family. Men cannot be regarded as so
distinct, separate and autonomous in ways that women are not. The differences be-
724 [Vol. 12
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from cooperation between parents, who after all are unrelated.
The children in effect serve as "hostages" to guard against any
intrigue between the parents, because any harm that one par-
ent inflicts upon another, necessarily reduces the prospects
that the offspring will flourish in their maturity. 2 Emotions are
not outside the realm of biological influence, but are heavily
dependent on them. The sentiment of love and affection that
binds parents together improves the long-term fitness of both
parents, given their common stake in the future. Played out in
nature, one finds that genetic egotism, coupled with reciprocal
altruism, translates itself into a form of ongoing generosity that
typically characterizes relations within the family.
There are of course variations within the overall pattern. As
external environments change, the return on parental invest-
ment in children changes as well, so that we should not expect
the same level of family intimacy across cultures and genera-
tions. But these variations should all conform to a system in
which at the margin one unit of parental expenditure yields two
units of benefit to the child. This relationship is determined not
solely by the basic interdependent utility function, but also by
other natural individual endowments and by external factors.
Whatever these differences in intensities, it is highly unlikely
that even today parents regard other people's children just like
their own-hence the enormous pains that people are prepared
to take in order to use surrogate mothers instead of ordinary
adoption.23
tween the sexes are important, but they are of degree, not kind. Still they may be large
enough to account for some ftindamental asymmetries in the social division of labor.
22. The model here is different from that presented in Becker, A Theory of Social Inter-
actions, 82 J. Po. EcoN. 1063, 1076 (1974). In the Becker model, children are con-
strained to act altruistically towards each other only because of parental threats to
withhold benefits from them if they do not. These constraints will break down if the
gains from misbehavior toward a sibling exceed the benefits that the parents are able to
withhold. The biological models predict stronger loyalty between siblings because each
has a stake in the welfare of the other, which will influence conduct, even in the absence
of any parental enforcement. There is of course a conflict of interest between the sib-
lings when the cost to the one sibling is greater than half the benefits conferred on the
other side. But that conflict is in principle no different between parent and child. Under
the Becker model, killing a sibling is far more likely to produce a private gain than it is
under the biological models. With Becker, the death of the sibling could increase the
welfare of the survivor, but it will generally decrease it under the biological models.
23. Thus we have the debate over surrogate mothers, in which the desire for genetic
connectedness of the father's part leads to large socialhcomplications. See generally L
ANDREWS, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, ABF WORKING
PAPERS 8701; In re Baby M, 217 NJ. Super., 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), rev'd, 109 NJ. 396,
537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
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Certain biological constants thus lie at the root of family be-
havior, and these demarcate the zone of voluntary market ex-
changes from that of the nonprice, nonexchange economy of
the family. Every legal system must draw some distinction be-
tween those within the family and those outsiders who deal
with the family at "arm's length." The strongest counterexam-
ple to individual self-interest only confirms the importance of
common practices, albeit with different intensities across times
and across cultures.
The wise utilitarian will not ignore these facts. Instead he will
try to minimize the pressures on legal enforcement in setting
the rules of social organization. His rules will therefore follow
the basic pattern of natural obligation as it is perceived to arise
within families. To transform inclination into duty is to derive
an "is" from an "ought." There is no Humean gap,24 only
some good common sense of the sort congenial to Hume's own
utilitarian biases. The utilitarian's major premise is that one
tries to organize social arrangements to best serve the individu-
als that compose them. The system of parental obligations
reduces the costs of external enforcement because it takes ad-
vantage of natural inclination to provide the assistance that the
law would otherwise have to compel by force. Taken in the ag-
gregate, the system thus generates high levels of care at rela-
tively low costs. Could one imagine the costs of any system that
systematically incurred the costs to strip children from their
parents at birth and assigned their upbringing to a stranger? It
is no accident that the attack on the family takes place in au-
thoritarian systems that can brook no counterweight to the
greater central power of the state, and to the conception of the
common good that all its citizens must accept. On matters of
the family, the natural law theorist then fares quite well by utili-
tarian standards. There is good empirical reason to believe in
the set of external constants that generate the need for some
constant social response.
II.
The congruence between natural law rules and their utilita-
rian justifications can be found not only with the family but also
in other critical areas. In this section I first examine the as-
24. See D. HuME, supra note 15, § 1, at 469-70.
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sumption of individual autonomy-that all individuals are free,
equal and independent in the state of nature. Next I address
the rules for the acquisition of property by first possession.
Third I look to the importance of custom as a source of rights
in both property and contract. Fourth I examine the question
of what counts as an "externality" sufficient to call forth legal
remedies under either the tort or the criminal law. Fifth I ex-
amine the "natural law" framework as it applies to the "just
compensation" requirement when the government takes prop-
erty for public use. In all cases my strategy is the same. I first
attack the ostensible natural law justifications for these critical
legal rules. Thereafter I develop alternative utilitarian ac-
counts, ones that revolve around the minimization of the trans-
actions costs, a theme that has achieved great prominence from
the work of Ronald Coase.2 5
A. Individual Autonomy
Within the family context, individual autonomy is not a dom-
inant theme, given the extensive network of status obligations,
enforced either by law or by an elaborate set of informal social
norms and sanctions. Nonetheless as the focus moves from the
family to the "public" realm, the assumption of individual au-
tonomy gains importance until it lies at the root of huge por-
tions of legal and political theory. Stated in its most naive form,
the claim for autonomy is a claim for self-ownership and self-
governance that each person has for his own body or person
and the labor it generates. The standard natural law argument
for autonomy is intuitive in form. People who are in possession
of themselves have a right to be in possession of themselves.
The counter-argument is that the possession of natural talents
is in some measure a question of individual luck, which cannot
serve as the principled basis of entitlements across individu-
als.2 6 Given this program, proposals are often made that natu-
ral talents should be socialized for the benefit of all, as all
persons have an equal claim to these endowments by virtue of
their common humanity. The argument itself can be given not
only an egalitarian, but a utilitarian twist by the observation
25. Set Coase, The Problem of Sodal Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
26. The theme is most heavily associated with J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE
(1971). I discuss some of the counterarguments in greater depth in Epstein, Luck, 6
Soc. POL. & PHIL. 17 (1988).
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that two common features of all human beings (the natural law
style of argument again) are, first, a diminishing marginal util-
ity of wealth and, second, a general tendency toward risk aver-
sion. Taken together, these imply that the shift of any unit of
resources from rich to poor satisfies some utilitarian mandate.
The utilitarian argument, however, is incomplete if it only
looks at the state of affairs desired in the end, independent of
the costs that are necessary to obtain it. These costs are very
high indeed, considering what is given up. When each individ-
ual is regarded (subject to the family obligations discussed
above) as the owner of his own labor, there is no need for any
routine coerced transaction to remove natural talents from the
person who is in possession of them to the person who is, by
some undisclosed standard, now entitled to their use or bene-
fits. Instead there is a single owner of each bit of human talent,
who is then in a position to transact in ways that benefit not
only himself, but all others with whom he does business. The
system operates in a decentralized fashion because the cost for
acquiring property rights in human labor is essentially zero. In
addition, there is no need to enter into any complex system of
recordation (such as that used for real estate) to explain who it
is that X must deal with in order to obtain the benefits of Y's
talents. That answer is always Y, subject to Y's own prior incon-
sistent contracts of which X has notice.27
The great advantage of the rule of self-ownership is that it
tends to preserve the total stock of natural talents that will
otherwise be dissipated by competition between rival persons
(who, perhaps, should not really be allowed to compete be-
cause they do not own themselves). Slavery is the most obvious
situation in which we are most uneasy about the ownership of
one person by another: conquest is surely in the interest of the
victor, but it does not register the preferences of the losers or
the total costs of the struggle-even if the owner is free to
(re)sell the slave his freedom. Conquest aside, there is no sys-
tem of governance known that allows some collective decision
to identify those persons who are superior to others, and to
pair each superior with the correctly identified inferior. Individ-
27. When there is notice of those contracts with third parties, there is an inducement
of breach of contract, which I have sought to explain on the same principles of notice
that are used to resolve inconsistent claims in the same chattel. See Epstein, Inducement
of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1987).
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ual self-ownership, subject only to the status of obligations
within the family, is surely a better mode of social organization,
for now connections between private persons can be made by
contract, which work to mutual benefit, rather than coercion,
which does not.
Once various institutions of slavery are rejected, a rule of
self-ownership has to prevail unless there is some superior sys-
tem that confers on each person, as it were, a partial interest in
all other persons. That complex network of human cross-own-
ership cannot-be achieved without resorting to some very ex-
tensive system of redistributive taxation and regulation (that is,
coercion that applies the fruit of A's talents to the benefit of B
through Z, and so on for each person). Yet here too there are
allocative losses associated with some uncertain pursuit of dis-
tributional equity. The use of this framework does not abolish
the fact of individual self-interest, suitably qualified by the prin-
ciple of inclusive fitness. So this new framework of interlacing
rights gives each (self-interested) person an incentive to im-
pose a greater share of obligations upon his rivals than he
bears for himself. The process generates some net resource
losses that must be borne in pursuit of this ostensible utilitarian
ideal.
It is risky to oversell the virtues of autonomy, for in the end it
turns out that self-ownership is not inviolate save by voluntary
consent. Nonetheless for these involuntary exchanges, self-
ownership serves as an indispensable baseline to measure
which exchanges are in the common good (that is, those for
which all persons gain) and those that are not.28 The standard
criticisms of the self-ownership theory observe that the argu-
ment is philosophically naive and incomplete and therefore
wrong. That line of argument is only good against a traditional
natural lawyer's philosophical defense that argues that self-
ownership and individual autonomy are "necessary" truths,
like those of logic or at least those of physics. That refutation
will have no power against the more modest functional de-
fense, which relies only on the most general features of human
conduct. So long as there are motivational and transactional
barriers to an ideal world, we must learn to live in the world of
28. For a discussion of the importance of these baselines, see generally Wittman,
Liabilityfor Harm or Restitution for Benefit, 13J. L cAL STUD. 57 (1984). For a discussion of
the takings question implicit here, see infra note 64.
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the second-best. Accordingly, we should tolerate the so-called
moral weaknesses of this rule, given the inability of anyone to
formulate a workable alternative system of property rights in
persons. When suitably fleshed out, utilitarian arguments bet-
ter explain this portion of natural rights than does natural
rights theory itself.
B. First Possession
Similar arguments carry over to the theory of first posses-
sion, which represents the dominant rule for the acquisition of
property adopted by both Locke and Blackstone in the natural
law tradition, and by Hume and Bentham in the utilitarian tra-
dition. Here too the natural law influence is powerful, as the
rule of first possession is often described as one that gives title
by way of "natural occupation."29 The standard natural law ac-
counts seek to justify this principle of natural occupation by
reference to an idea of individual desert, or perhaps by the la-
bor theory of value. For Locke the theory reads, at least at first
blush, as though it were one of desert because he constantly
insists that the great part of the value of any land taken from
the commons by first occupancy is attributable to the labor in-
vested in it. One key passage reads as follows:
He that is nourished by the Acorns he pickt up under an
Oak, or the Apples he gathered from the Trees in the wood,
has certainly appropriated them to himself. No Body can
deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, When did they
begin to be his? When he digested? Or when he ate? Or
when he boiled? Or when he brought them home? Or when
he pickt them up? And 'tis plain, if the first gathering made
them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinc-
tion between them and common. That added something to
them more than Nature, the common mother of all, had
done; and so they became his private right. And will anyone
say he had no right to those Acorns or Apples he thus appro-
priated, because he had not the consent of all Mankind to
make them his? Was it a Robbery thus to assume to himself
what belonged to all in Common? If such a consent as that
was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty
God had given him.
3 0
29. See, e.g., 2 Gmus, INSTITUTES 66 (de Zelueta trans. 1946); D. HUME, supra note 15,
§ 3, at 505-07.
30. J. LocxE, Two TREAsEs OF GOVERNMENT 306 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed.
1698) (§ 28, Second Treatise) (emphasis in original).
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There are a number of objectives to the labor theory that are
commonly made when it is cast as a theory of desert. Initially
we have to reject ownership by first possession if we reject the
prior Lockean argument that all people own their labor and
natural talents. If these are not owned by each individual, then
he has no right to take an asset held in common-his labor-
and turn it to an end from which he derives some exclusive
benefit. The first-possession rule is dependent upon the self-
ownership rule; if that rule falls, then first possession falls as
well.
In addition, the labor theory of ownership runs into difficul-
ties even if a person does own his own labor. Thus one recur-
rent criticism of Locke is that his theory at best accounts for
why the first possessor or occupier should have a lien for labor
instead of outright ownership of the land or thing in ques-
tion. 1 Locke tried to duck this difficulty by choosing an exam-
ple that almost made it disappear: He asked about the
ownership to the uncleared and rocky lands of his day, but not
to the discovery of vast quantities of cheap oil located beneath
the lands of some lucky sheik or cattle rancher. With the fields,
his answer was that ninety-nine percent of the value in the land
was attributable to the labor that was added.32 It is in essence a
de minimis answer designed to silence anyone who would dis-
pute the title of the laborer. But his response does not deal
with the case of the lucky owner of oil-bearing lands. Even in
his own case it does not allow him to bridge rigorously the
small, but theoretically significant gap that remains. Ninety-
nine percent is not a hundred percent, so what should be done
with the unearned increment, however small, that nature has
supplied? The gap here is as important between 1 and 0.99
percent, which separates the universe of determinate solutions
from that of the probabilistic calculation.
Lodged against an intuitive natural rights theory, these ob-
jections have conclusive force. But there are utilitarian rejoin-
31. See L BECxER, supra note 9, at 34; Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L
Rrv. 1221, 1228 (1979).
32. I think it will be but a very modest Computation to say, that of the Products of
the Earth useful to the life of man [nine-tenths] are the eects of/abour: Nay, if
we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several
Expenses bout them, what in them is purely owing to Nature, and what to ta-
bour, we shall find, that in most of them [ninety-nine hundredths] are wholly to
be put on the account of tabour.
J. LocKE, supra note 30, at 314 (§ 40, Second Treatise).
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ders that these objections do not meet. Initially there are
strong utilitarian justifications for individual self-ownership in
the original position. So the Lockean solution cannot be at-
tacked on the ground that the first possessor has no valid claim
to his own labor or talents. Similarly, there are functional ex-
planations to justify giving the first possessor outright owner-
ship of the thing. To hold that the labor theory of value
accounts only for a lien, but not full ownership, gives rise to the
identical problem faced with respect to individual self-owner-
ship: who gets the difference between the total value of the
thing, and that portion of value attributable to the labor of the
first possessor? To treat that increment as a common pool asset
necessarily requires extensive administrative costs, first to mea-
sure the size of the increment in each case, and then to assign
its value to all other persons, none of whom have any specific
claim to the thing in question. (Locke is right that the first pos-
sessor is different from the others.) In some cases that equity
may be large, but at the margin it will tend toward zero. Taken
over the full range of cases, the assessments and reassignments
necessarily reduce the total value of the stock in question, and
undermine the willingness of individuals to incur the costs of
discovery and appropriation in the first instance. It is also quite
possible that the costs of finding the line between total value
and the lien for labor exceeds the total value of the "equity" in
the thing that the public is said to hold as of right.
In the end, therefore, the strongest justification for the strict
rule that first possession yields complete ownership, not the
lien for labor, is not one of individual desert. It is one of mod-
est prudence. It is therefore more congenial to Hume, who saw
in the rule the virtues that it gave to the "stability of posses-
sion.""3 In the long run we are all better off if the surplus in
things remains well defined with a single owner, than if each
and every owner surrenders some of what he has acquired in
exchange for the right to some portion of the surplus of lands
acquired by others. The first-possession rule leaves each thing
with a determinate owner, who is then capable of entering into
voluntary transactions over the thing with other persons. These
transactions are facilitated, as Locke rightly notes, by the exist-
ence of both money and durable goods, which render inappo-
33. See D. HUME, supra note 15, at 502.
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site any limitations on how much one person can acquire on his
own account.3 4 A simple functionalism thus explains the appeal
of the rule.
It might be suggested that the best way to avoid the appor-
tionment problems is simply to reject flatly the proposition that
any person should have the right to mix his individual labor
with external things that are held in common. No person can
add his labor to things that are in common ownership. At this
point the rebuttal again takes on a utilitarian cast. Locke him-
self was aware of the enormous bargaining problems that exist
if unanimous consent should be required to determine what
particular things should be used by what persons. The last sen-
tence in the quotation above from section 28 of the Second Trea-
tise, with its pointed reference to starvation, makes the point.
There will be bargaining breakdown if the consent of all indi-
viduals is necessary for the consumption of any portion of the
whole. A system of first possession allows all to survive, and
hence (to use modem terminology) has to be Pareto superior
to this alternative of mutually assured destruction. Now the ul-
timate justification for Locke is no longer desert theory, but
simple necessity. Blackstone himself takes exactly the same
line.3 5 Consent is not required to establish property rights be-
cause the number of parties is too great for it to work. When
34. SeeJ. LocKE, supra note 30, at 312-13 (§ 37, Second Treatise). Prior to this passage,
Locke has tried to write as though the unilateral appropriation by one individual is
acceptable because there is always as much and as good left for others. See id. at 307
(§ 29, Sicond Treatise). In section 37, however, he shifts gears and notes that although
individuals may have lost from what another has appropriated from the common, they
gain because of their opportunity to share in the greater production of land under
cultivation:
he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but in-
crease the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the sup-
port of humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are
(to speak much within compass) ten times more, than those, which are yielded
by an acre of Land, of an equal richness, lyeing waste in common.
Id at 312 (§ 37, Second Treatise); see also id at 317-18 (§ 46, Section Treatise) (arguing that
the ability to convert plums into nuts, and perishables into durables, removes the limi-
tations based upon waste in the original position).
Passages of this sort have led others to defend Locke on efficiency grounds. See
Miller, Economic Effiiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y, 401, 410
(1987) ("Mhe Lockean Proviso... has a function not unlike the role of certain effi-
ciency criteria in modem economic thought.").
35. See 2 W. BLACKSTONe, supra note 11, at *8 ("Necessity begat property, and, in
order to insure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along
with it a long train of inseparable concomitants; states, governments, laws, punish-
ments, and the public exercise of religious duties.").
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necessity, not consent, becomes the origin of property, then we
have a utilitarian system, not a social contract theory.
The next question that one has to face is what is acquired by
first possession. Here in a matter congenial with the general
feature, all systems of private law have roughly the same con-
tours. Many standard modem accounts talk about possession,
use and disposition of the fee,3 6 and it is possible to compile
somewhat longer lists of incidents as well.37 One standard ob-
jection to the Lockean theory is that it may explain why the first
possessor has some special interest in the thing, but it does not
explainwhy he is entitled to the robust form of absolute owner-
ship that is routinely conferred upon him by well-developed
legal systems (at least in their private law guise). Yet the func-
tional explanation for the robust bundle of rights follows in
utilitarian terms from the considerations above. It is very costly
for a social system to have partial bundles of rights in discrete
things, for then some additional way must be found to assign
those rights that did not pass into private hands with the origi-
nal appropriation. Suppose that taking possession of a thing
gave right to possession only so long as actual possession of
the thing were maintained. It would then follow that no farmer
could leave his fields untended and go to market. Blackstone
saw the point dearly,3 s as did Bentham.39 The purpose of a
legal rule is to allow the right to possession to continue even
36. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 57-62 (1985).
37. For the standard account of the incidents of ownership, see Honor6, Ownership,
in OxFoRv ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961). His account of "lib.
eral" ownership stresses the right to possess, to use, to manage, to enjoy income, to
preserve capital, to have security against expropriation, to dispose, and to be liable for
execution for debts. It is said to apply to all "mature" legal systems and to many primi-
tive ones besides, thus confirming the natural lawyer's belief in the universality of legal
systems. The key tension between primitive and modem systems of ownership relates
to "who" owns the property. With extended dan and tribal relationships, it is much
harder to draw the line between family and stranger within civil society. Family rules
tend to be indefinite and emphasize common control, while rules between strangers
emphasize the importance of separation and boundaries. The rules, as it were, follow
the interdependence of utility functions.
38. See supra note 13.
39. The savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it for himself, so long as
his cave is undiscovered; so long as he watches to defend it, and is stronger
than his rivals; but that is all. How miserable and precarious is such a posses-
sionl If we suppose the least agreement among savages to respect the acquisi-
tions of each other, we see the introduction of a principle to which no name
can be given but that of law. A feeble and momentary expectation may result
from time to time from circumstances purely physical; but a strong and per-
manent expectation can result only from law. That which, in the natural state,
was an almost invisible thread, in the social state becomes a cable. Property
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when the fact of possession is no longer indubitable, unless and
until the owner has decided to abandon the thing. Legal pro-
tection is thus a cheap substitute for the active defense and pa-
trol of property, which is why theories of possession from
Roman law to the present have always stressed the acquisition
and loss of possession,4 ° and presumed that until possession is
abandoned it is retained without any independent showing of
the kind of mental or physical facts needed to establish the
original acquisition.
Similarly, the standard rule-that possession generates own-
ership of an indefinite duration-eliminates the awkward prob-
lem of deciding who owns the land in question after the death
of the original possessor. Instead of having to open anew the
prospects of possession after the death of the possessor or,
even his descendants; the property can be developed in full,
secure in the knowledge that the gains from improvement can
be captured either by sale, or by consuming the proceeds.
thereof, if desired, during life.
The first possession rule has powerful functional justifica-
tions that cut across societies. The basic problems of incen-
tives, allocation and administrative costs that it addresses are
more or less constants across different cultures, so that we
should expect the rule to be relatively robust, which it has
been. Nonetheless there are certain variations that have to be.
taken into account as well. Thus once first possession becomes
the rule of acquisition, it is important to know when each claim
of possession is perfected. There is a powerful need to develop
subordinate rules to implement the central rule of acquisition.
At this level we should expect a certain degree of diversity in
the customary or statutory practices. In a rocky New England
and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was
no property; take away laws and property ceases.
J. BENTHAM, A THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (1931 ed.) (1864).
The last sentence is said to expose a strong anti-natural law bias. In one sense it does
because it excludes the possibility that law precedes the state. But his position is an
explicit "natural law-type" position because of the sense in which the legal rules
strengthen the expectations that people have in the natural state. Again, the reference
to "the least agreement" echoes social contract theory of the Lockean stripe. But the
more forceful argument is that the forced surrender of the mutual rights of aggression
leaves everyone better off-itself a takings-type argument.
40. "The Romans offer no definition of possession. They take it for granted that the
lessee, the borrower, &c., do not possess. What they are interested in is not the abstract
question of the meaning of possession, but the practical question of how it is acquired
and lost." B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LAw 112 (1962).
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soil, it may be sensible to mark the boundary lines of one's
property by stones collected from the soil, while in heavy for-
ests the edge of territories could be marked by niches in trees.
In other cases, claims offices and recordation systems may be
used to establish both the scope and priority of claims, whether
to land or minerals. But notwithstanding this apparent diver-
sity, the same principle appears to govern. That system of iden-
tification will be used that gives the largest net gain in clarity,
given the costs of implementation. These subordinate conven-
tions do not undermine the universality of a first-possession
rule. They only illustrate the myriad of ways in which it can be
implemented.
The first-possession rule has yet another desirable feature,
given that it may be merged with the status obligations associ-
ated with families. If A obtains possession of an unowned tract
of land, he may not do so solely on his own account, but rather
as head of his family, clan or tribe. If several persons combine
to take possession of some unowned property, it will be divided
in accordance with the terms of their partnership joint venture.
Once it has excluded outsiders, the rule of first possession
therefore dovetails neatly into the more complex rules of fam-
ily and business associations. It is therefore widely adaptable to
different social organizations. First possession works as well for
larger groups as it does for atomistic individuals.
The origin of property, then, is rooted in practical necessity,
given the inability to reach any broad compact over the distri-
bution of natural things. But the internal operation of the sys-
tem need not operate by necessity as well. The transactional
difficulties are radically reduced once individual titles are estab-
lished by first possession. Within this changed environment,
consent now becomes the appropriate method for exchange.
Only two parties need be involved in order to transfer property
rights, so the bargaining range will be relatively small given the
large number of potential suppliers of standard commodities
like acorns and apples. The general rules of transfer should
have a consensual basis even though the rules of acquisition do
not. The natural lawyers understood this point as well, for they
included in their basic rules the principles for contract, espe-
cially as a mode for transferring ownership of things already
reduced to ownership by first possession. Their rules were not
couched in terms of market efficiency, but they surely facili-
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tated and fostered market institutions, as opposed to any pro-
tective, mercantilist or guild mentality.
C. Custom
The use of custom is yet another point where there is a pow-
erful, if unappreciated convergence between natural law theo-
ries and utilitarianism. Within the natural law tradition, custom
has long played a powerfil role. Operationally, it was not pos-
sible to observe the divine hand at work. Historically, there was
little understanding of the biological imperatives that work in a
cross-cultural setting. Even so, it was always possible to ob-
serve that certain legal rules or conventions were in fact fol-
lowed in large numbers of different societies, from which it
could be easily-too easily inferred-that what was common to
all "civilized" people-the ius commune or ius gentium- necessar-
ily had the force of law.4 The chain of inference is faulty if
custom is treated as a universal imperative, without further
qualification or caution. Slavery was a common practice in
many ancient cultures that regarded themselves as civilized,
and conquest was generally regarded as an appropriate way to
acquire slaves-as an act of mercy towards those whom the
conqueror could otherwise kill with impunity.42 It is hard to
offer any normative defenses of those practices today, and we
should all be better off if we did not try.
A single counterexample to a general rule, however, does
not necessarily lead to its abandonment. Qualification may well
turn out to be the better alternative. Custom should not be re-
garded as dispositive with respect to those persons who are
strangers to the culture that has generated the custom in ques-
41. Every people that is governed by statutes and customs observes partly its
own peculiar law and partly the common law of all mankind. The law which a
people established for itself is peculiar to it, and is called ius civile (civil law) as
being the special law of that ciuitas (State), which the law that natural reason
establishes among all mankind is followed by all peoples alike, and is called ius
gentium (law of nations, or law of the world) as being the law observed by all
mankind.
1 GAIus, supra note 29, at 1.
In practice the /us civile was devoted to special forms or ceremonies needed to make a
will or to convey real property. The ius gentium dominated issues of substance, but the
civil law was important for certain methods of transfer. See, e.g., id at 16-28. The pas-
sage of property by ordinary delivery is part of the general law, but the unique forms of
Roman conveyance--in lure cessio and manipatio-are part of the general law. See id. at
65. Acquisition by original occupation or possession is also a part of the ius gentium as a
natural mode of acquisition. See id. at 66.
42. See id at 129.
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tion. Conquest is a norm that may appear in all cultures at the
same time, but in each instance it is a rule that prefers the in-
side members to the rest of the world. It is never the case that
the right of conquest has been agreed across different cultures
before the onset of conflict. Quite the opposite, international
treaties on the question of prisoners have generally moved to-
ward the amelioration of the position of the captives in ques-
tion.48 The independent rules generated in each culture with
respect to the status of outsiders thus represents a classical
(and literal) prisoner's dilemma game in which there is (in utili-
tarian terms) every reason to believe that the local custom will
systematically deviate from the social optimum.
Nonetheless a different class of customs is entitled to far
greater respect-those that operate internal to a given group
or society. Here one speaks about the rules that bind all for the
benefit of all. At any given time the gaming dynamics are totally
different from what they would be in the case in which the
losses are external, for now each person (or subgroup) knows
as a general matter that he (or it) is equally likely to assume
either of two future roles: the owner whose land is trespassed,
or the owner of the animals who do the trespassing. If forced to
choose a general rule of conduct to govern both the bitter and
the sweet, no one can do better for himself than by choosing
the social optimum. The point is of course one that is con-
stantly stressed by references to John Rawls's veil of ignorance,
and Friedrich Hayek's spontaneous order,4 4 but in truth its ori-
gins date back further. It is the idea behind Hegel's reference
to "die List der Vernunft," or the cunning of reason. It also lies
at the root of Maitland's classic discussion of the question of
tenure: here individual nobles occupied many rungs in the feu-
dal ladder, and never knew in advance of dispute whether they
would be lord or tenant.45 Hence there was the pressure to
43. See Frey & Buhofer, Prisoners and Property Rights, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 19, 36 (1988).
44. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGIST AON, AND LIBERTY (1973). For an exhaustive
commentary, seeJ. GRAY, HAYEK ON IaBERTY 27-55 (2d ed. 1986).
45. Lastly, though pure feudal theory can draw no distinction between the king
and the other lords, still we have already seen that the English king has very
exceptional rights within the feudal sphere. Even if no exceptional rules were
applied to him, still his position would be unique. Too often in discussions of
questions about feudal law we are wont to speak of lords and tenants as
though they were two different classes of persons with conflicting interests.
Therefore it is necessary to remember that the king was the only person who
was always lord and never tenant; that his greatest feudatories had one inter-
est as lords, another as tenants; that the baron, who did not like to see his
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adopt those customary rules efficient for the relationship as a
whole.
Therefore, when there are large numbers of repetitive and
similar transactions, there is a powerful set of incentives at
work to fasten upon the optimal set of rules, not by conscious
design, but by incremental development. There is accordingly
a good utilitarian explanation as to why we should place great
confidence in the slow form of evolutionary growth that natural
lawyers have generally praised. The evolution is reliable be-
cause all participants have powerful incentives to articulate and
support general norms that work toward the long term advan-
tage of all members of the community.
Robert Ellickson has pointed out the development of these
powerful customary norms of "neighborliness" that govern
disputes over cattle trespass among the ranchers in Shasta
County, California,46 but in truth the practices go back far ear-
lier in Anglo-American Law. Take one example. The law of cat-
tle trespass illustrates the convergence between customary
practices and the efficient utilitarian outcome. The customary
rule allowed each party to hold the trespassing cattle of his
neighbor until amends were paid for the damage so caused,
with an allowance for the cost of interim keep.4" The underly-
ing rules of cattle trespass were strict, so that the simple fact
that the animals strayed made it clear to both parties that the
amends were indeed owing. The choice of amends had the ef-
fect of avoiding any complex bargaining problems that might
otherwise exist if one farmer were allowed to keep another's
animals until their possession had been repurchased by its true
owner.
vassals creating new sub-tenancies, could not forget that he himself had a
lord. The conflict of interests takes place within the mind of every magnate of
the realm, and the result is that the development of definite law is slow.
I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 331-32 (1968 ed.). Prior to
this discussion, Maitland sets out the ways in which tenants can seek to undercut the
interest of their lords with substitution or subinfeudation-what we would call today
opportunistic or strategic behavior. See id. at 330-31. Elsewhere Pollock and Maitland
observe that "[i]n England tenure is no mark of a class, and we may say the same of
'feudal' tenure." Id. at 234.
46. See Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,
38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 672 (1986); Eilickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories
of Social Control, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Tithe Case, Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. 7, f 27, pl. 5 (1506), translated in C.
FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw: TORT AND CONTRACT 197 (1949)
("[Thus if I have beasts damage feasant, I shall not justify my entry to chase them out
unless I first tender all amends.").
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The problem is the familiar one of bilateral monopoly.
Under that rights structure, the cattle owner should in principle
be willing to pay an amount up to the full value of the animal to
recover it, while the landowner should be satisfied with any
amount greater than the damage done plus the interim costs of
keeping the animal. The amends formula cut down the size of
the bargaining range, while the requirement to pay for the
animal's keep encouraged the cattle owner to put in a prompt
appearance so that amends could be assessed on the strength
of accurate information. As most individuals owned both land
and cattle in roughly equal proportions, the rule worked an
overall allocative improvement without any systematic redis-
tributive effects. The desirable features of the system were not
lost on any of the participants to it, even if the utilitarian argu-
ments were not formally understood. Indeed when a legal com-
mission proposed changing the ancient rules on the ground
that they did not conform to the ethical principles behind a
negligence system, the farmers rose up to defeat the system.48
Other customs, whether as part of the trade or of the region,
typically had the same desirable features-so long as the risks
of external harms-are safely put to one side. The approach of
Hume and Hayek-observe in order that you may under-
stand-will usually do more to advance the welfare of the com-
munity than any conscious effort to rejigger rules with an overt,
interventionist utilitarian calculus. The small government, re-
active sense of the natural lawyer again makes good sense from
a sound and complete utilitarian perspective-one that takes
account of the political pressures that can lead to systematic
distortions in legislation.
48. See Report of the Committee on the Law of Civil Liability for Damage Done by
Animals, Cmnd. 8746, at 4, para. 3 (1953) ("This class of liability is of interest only to
farmers and landowners[,] and the general public are not affected thereby."). The law
of cattle trespass was therefore left alone, although the academic position was squarely
for negligence:
On the historical side the topic is, I think, a fascinating one. It throws a vivid
light on primitive modes of thought, and on the stages by which they were
outgrown. It marks a comparatively early departure from the archaic rule that
liability was confined to personal acts. Yet the very precocity of this kind of
liability gave it a character of its own; it has not been properly absorbed into
the law of negligence.
G. WILLIAMS, LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS V (1939).
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D. External Harms
The prior discussion of custom indicated that external harms
always cause a special problem for any legal system, and natu-
ral law is no exception. Typically these harms were governed
by the principle non sic utere tuo ut alienum laedes: do not use your
own things in order to harm another person. This legal princi-
ple is reflected in the famous passage from Mill's On Liberty:
[T]he only purpose for which power can rightfully be exer-
cised over any member of a civilised community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either phys-
ical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in
the opnions of others, to do so would be wise, or even
right.y9
As stated, however, the legal maxim and the Millian postu-
late only postpone the central inquiry: what should be counted
as an external harm? As a first approximation, the thorough-
going utilitarian answer is anything that serves to diminish the
subjective values held by another individual, whether neighbor,
competitor or stranger. Thus it becomes impossible to rule out
any type of subjective loss on the ground that the losses are
causally remote, at least as a matter of ordinary language or
everyday intuitions. 5' The connection between conduct and
consequence is made plain by the complaint of the victim. In-
deed when there are express contracts, say, as part of a com-
mon unit development, it is quite clear that the parties
(working through the common owner) take into account far
more than those obvious harms that are caused by the physical
invasion from the property of one person to another.5 1 The
aim of the parties in an ordinary contract is to maximize their
joint utility, subject to whatever external and practical con-
straints under which they labor. There is no reason at all to
think that they will adopt a categorical rule that only takes into
account the overt types of physical harm, while ignoring more
subtle effects of greater practical significance. If aesthetics
mean more to the members of a common unit development,
49. J.S. MILL, ON LABERTY 212 (C. Eliot ed. 1909) (1858).
50. On the tension between ordinary language and legal theories of causation, see
Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 431-33 (1975).
51. I discuss these issues at length in Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 906 (1988).
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then they may impose strict controls on set-backs and exterior
design while tolerating relatively relaxed restrictions on music
and noise. It hardly matters that the aesthetics ordinarily lie
outside the law of nuisance while noise is the paradigmatic
wrong. What the parties think, not what the law holds, is deci-
sive. Any harm that the parties perceive should be taken into
account, just like any benefit.
Does this broad definition of harm mark the end of any sys-
tem of personal liberty, so that libertarian and utilitarian theory
are unreconciliable after all? Just this point has been made
forceftlly by H.L.A. Hart in Law, Liberty, and Morality:
It may be said that the distress occasioned by the bare
thought that others are offending in private against morality
cannot constitute "harm," except in a few neurotic or hyper-
sensitive persons who are literally "made ill" by this thought
.... The fundamental objection surely is that a right to be
protected from the distress which is inseparable from the
bare knowledge that others are acting in ways you think
wrong, cannot be acknowledged by anyone who recognises
individual liberty as a value. For the extension of the utilita-
rian principle that coercion may be used to protect men from
harm, so as to include their protection from this form of dis-
tress, cannot stop there. If distress incident to the belief that
others are doing wrong is harm, so also is the distress inci-
dent to the belief that others are doing what you do not want
them to do. To punish people for causing this form of dis-
tress would be tantamount to punishing them simply be-
cause others object to what they do; and the only liberty that
could coexist with this extension of the utilitarian principle is
liberty to do those things to which no one seriously objects.
Such liberty is plainly quite nugatory. 52
Hart's objection contains much good common sense, but its
attack on utilitarianism misses the analytical point. In order to
see the error, it is necessary to draw a distinction between two
different kinds of legal worlds. The first is a world of perfect
decisionmaking, where virtuous and incorruptible public offi-
cials can acquire perfect information and enforce the law per-
fectly, both at zero cost. The normal, passions and temptations
of interest-group politics are nowhere to be found. The second
is our world, where information is costly to acquire, enforce-
52. H.L.A. HART, LAW, IaBERTY, AND MoALrry 46-47 (1963). Hart is speaking di-
rectly of the criminalization of homosexual conduct, but his point goes more strongly.
There is a definition of externality so broad as to consume the idea of liberty.
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ment is error-prone, and some public officials are likely to
abuse whatever discretion the law confers upon them. The
proper definitions of external harm differ in these two worlds.
So too does the proper social response.
In a world of perfect public enforcement, we should opt for
the broadest possible definition of externality. There is no rea-
son not to take into account every disutility that every individual
suffers from the action of every other individual. In effect we
should be able to calculate the net benefits and the net losses of
all persons, and then adopt that course of action that will maxi-
mize the total net value of the whole, taking subjective utilities
(which we can now costlessly measure) into account. We could
satisfy any distributional concerns with (costless) transfer pay-
ments that make everyone better off in consequence of our
public intervention.5 As the social marginal cost of preventing
harm is always equal to zero, we should strive to capture every
possible social benefit imaginable.
Now let us suppose, however, that we have a system in which
the costs of public administration are very high indeed. The
good utilitarian still believes that marginal considerations are
decisive, so now the inquiry is to identify those externalities
that can be redressed for a sum that is smaller than the exter-
nality itself. But the greater the refinement in the legal rule, the
greater the costs of information and enforcement, and the
greater the risk of public abuse. One therefore has to target
those externalities that on net produce the most serious nega-
tive results. Other externalities have to be disregarded. The
problem here is of course compounded because actions that
harm strangers often confer gains upon the actors who commit
them. Ceteris paribus, when enforcement is costly, the proper
strategy is- to go after situations that seem to generate losses on
net.
Once these conditions are taken into account, then the tradi-
tional libertarian concerns with force (including the threat of
force) and fraud (including concealment, and perhaps some
forms of nondisclosure) suddenly become a good proxy for
those kinds of harms that are worth preventing in a friction-
filled world and those that are not. Force involves the infliction
of relatively visible harms for which restraint ex ante and dam-
53. See infra note 60.
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ages ex post seem imperative. It is usually possible to tell who
hit whom in any given context. Even if one takes the Coasean
position that all matters of causation are perfectly reciprocal in
a zero-transaction-cost world, that position does not carry over
to our high-transaction-cost world, where the prohibition
against the use of force (including physical invasion in the land
use cases) becomes the best first approximation of how to draw
boundaries between different people.5 4 The level of public dis-
cretion needed to enforce these rules against force and fraud
(especially the former) is relatively small, while the net gains
from eriforcement seem to be large. It is very unlikely that the
party who commits an assault values the right to kill another as
much as that other person values his right to self-preservation.
(The tragedy is that he may value the death of another person
more than his cost of killing him, which is why we face the
problem of aggression in the first place.) The more diffuse
harms from competitive injury, disappointed expectations, hurt
feelings and ordinary business competition are of such fre-
quent occurrence, and (at least with competition) produce such
general social benefits, that public officials should ignore the
costs of these activities instead of undertaking in countless
transactions the unhappy task of identifying all winners and
taxing them to pay some sum to all losers. 55
There are some important exceptions to this general rule.
The protection of intangible property rights such as patents
and trademarks are all done by analogizing the actions for in-
fringement to the ordinary common-law remedies for trespass
to land and chattels. Similarly, the willingness to attack hori-
zontal cartels and price-fixing arrangements rests on the formal
proof that monopoly practices result in net social harm that
might justify the very high positive costs of public enforcement.
The various approaches-nonenforcement of contracts, private
actions by third party consumers, or regulatory clearances-all
have their relative advantages and disadvantages. 56 Yet how-
ever these remedial questions are resolved, any consideration
54. See generally Epstein, Causation-in Context: An Afterword, 63 CHL-KErr L, REv. 653,
666-68 (1987) (arguing that ideas of causation do make sense precisely because our
ordinary experience is formed in a high transaction cost world).
55. For a forceful demonstration of the point, see Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property
Rights, 9J.L. & ECON. 61 (1966).
56. Epstein, Private Property and the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust, in Ethics, Eco.
nomics and the Law, 24 NOMOS 49 (1982). On balance, my favorite position is still one
that refuses to enforce horizontal price-fixing arrangements, but does not allow any
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of the costs of enforcement tends to drive the philosophical
utilitarian back to the libertarian rules with their relatively fixed
prohibitions against force and misrepresentation. The good
utilitarian with even a modest dose of public choice theory
quickly narrows the account of external harm that is made op-
erative within the legal system.
E. Forced Exchanges
The attitude toward external harms also shapes the legal re-
sponse to the problem of forced exchanges. Here it is possible
to think of very strong systems of autonomy that preclude all
such exchanges whatsoever-one, for example, that excludes
all antitrust laws. A strong position of that sort has been sug-
gested by Ronald Dworkin,5 7 but ultimately his arguments rest
on the same kinds of misconceptions that undermine Hart's ar-
gument that utilitarianism is necessarily inconsistent with a sys-
tem of individual liberty.58
Dworkin's precise argument is that the search for wealth
maximization-he could have said as well utility maximiza-
tion-necessarily leads to a disregard of distributional con-
cerns, so that it is possible that the total gains will be larger
while the share of some individuals under this regime will be
smaller. To make his point, Dworkin resorts to the example of
Derek and Amartya. The omniscient government official knows
that Amartya values the book at $3, while Derek, its present
owner, values it at $2. Nonetheless for some reason there are
inpenetrable barriers to private exchange (in this case a trans-
action cost of $1 or more will do). The public official therefore
takes the book from her and gives it to him. The question that
Dworkin puts is why should anyone think this a better world
after the forced exchange with the book lodged in Amartya's
hand than it was before, especially given that Derek has re-
ceived no compensation for his loss?
Stated more generally, this example is an objection to the
Kaldor-Hicks, or potential compensation, standard of effi-
ciency, which allows changes in property rights so long as it is
clear that the winners from the exchange would be willing to
actions by third parties. The administrative costs of the system are lower than the alter-
native, and there is little chance of the rules misfiring.
57. Se Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9J. LEGAL SmUD. 191 (1980).
58. See id. at 197.
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pay a sum of money in compensation that would satisfy the
losers for their losses.59 What if $2.50 in compensation is paid,
so that both sides are left better off than before, as the Pareto
standard of social welfare requires? But insisting on this more
exacting standard is hardly an objection to the wealth (or util-
ity) maximization position as stated. If government officials can
make perfect assessments of utilities and costless transfers of
assets between parties, then we are now in a world where maxi-
mum government intervention is desirable. Public officials can
therefore at zero cost dole out perfect compensation as well. If
Amartya has $2.50 in cash, it can be plucked from his hands
and deposited in Derek's account. If she does not, then we can
finance the exchange by a costless loan agreement in a perfect
capital market that allows her to pay at some future time. Under
the assumptions as stated, every Kaldor-Hicks improvement can be
costlessly converted into a more demanding Pareto improvement. At this
point the question becomes, why should anyone want to re-
main a pure libertarian when both sides can be made better off
by the beneficient use of public coercion, given that voluntary
exchanges are by hypothesis totally impossible?
One can take the point further. We should not know what
sense to make of the compensation requirement at all in a
world in which officials acted with such disinterested, costless
precision. Presumably there would be lots of individual occa-
sions for intervention when public officials have perfect knowl-
edge and private parties have none. We should therefore want
the government simply to move all assets to the higher value
use. If there were enough utility increasing transactions, then
the odds are extremely small that at the end of the period any
single person would be left worse off than before.' Surely ex
59. See generally Coleman, Effdiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFSTrA L. REv.
509 (1980) (examining the various measures of social welfare employed in political and
economic theory).
60. To give some sense of the magnitude, assume that there were 100 people, each
of whom were made to participate in 10 forced exchanges each year. Assume further
that for each exchange, the winner got 5 more units of satisfaction than the loser sacri-
ficed, because the loss equalled 10 and the gain was 15. The total gain from operating
this system is 5,000 (100 persons x 10 transactions x 5 units of gain). Any person who
received 5 times and surrendered 5 times would have a net positive return of 25 units
((15 x 5) - (10 x 5)). If he received 4 times, and paid 6, he would still comd out even. ((4
x 15) = (6 x 10)). Only if he received 3 times, and paid out 7 would he be a net loser,
by 5 units. The odds of that happening on ten transactions are equal to 176/1024 or
about 17 percent. If there are 1,000 transactions, then the total gain equals 500,000
units on the above assumptions (100 x 1,000 x 5). The chance of coming out a net loser
(for example, winning on 399 or fewer transactions) shrinks to less than one percent.
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ante, everyone would consent to allow takings without compen-
sation if the twin conditions of public beneficience and omnis-
cience held, at least if the alternative were no transactions at
all. What lingering dissatisfaction remains could be removed by
a costless annual accounting that eliminated all net losers ex
post. Transactional accounting becomes quite irrelevant. If de-
sired, the payments could be more substantial so that everyone
received exactly the same gains as the median person. Note
that both Derek and Amartya each obtained $.50 of gain if
$2.50 were paid in the above example. The case is exactly par-
allel to that of external harms. Given these radical assumptions,
who could care about preserving competition, markets or com-
pensation? State regulation would trump any conceivable form
-or organization. Constitutional protection against taking prop-
erty without just compensation would properly be regarded,
not as a fundamental safeguard of individual liberty, but as a
redundant curiosity.
The situation instantly changes, however, once we relax the
strong assumption of Dworkin's model and make assumptions
that better fit the real world. Here it seems likely that, with re-
spect to two-party transactions of standard commodities-for
example, that of Derek and Amartya-the parties will have bet-
ter information about their own utilities than would the gov-
ernment, and that their transaction costs of implementing deals
would be lower. Voluntary markets should certainly be allowed
to develop, and there is little cause to think that forced govern-
ment transfers play even a support role in this system. How-
ever, there are many situations in which forced exchanges
could well be useful. Most concretely there are often situa-
tions-for example, with common pool assets, such as the fish-
ery or the oil field-in which large numbers of separate
claimants will find it very difficult to reach voluntary agreement
because of the wide bargaining range and the large number of
participants. These are exactly the cases that Dworkin sup-
presses with his simple two-person example. Yet they are ex-
actly the cases in which the autonomy principle is at its weakest.
If the'choice is between bargaining impasse and no gains, and
forced exchanges at some positive cost, but with real net gains,
then the utilitarian case for forced takings is strengthened.
As the number of transactions expand, the aggregate gains swamp the distributional
consequences.
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In this new environment of government action, the require-
ment of compensation has an important functional justification.
It is often very difficult for public officials to make the right
comparisons between the losses to individual property owners
and the gains to society at large. A rule that forces compensa-
tion to the losers makes it far easier for courts to monitor the
legislature and the executive for potential misconduct. In es-
sence one quickly gets to the principle that is embodied in the
Takings Clause of the Constitution: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation. '6 The de-
tailed explication of the clause, and its application to various
forms of taxes, regulation and changes in liability rules is quite
beyond the scope of this article, and I shall not attempt to re-
peat here what I have argued elsewhere.62 Nonetheless, the
congruence between utilitarian and natural law principles here
is again complete. Blackstone endorsed it in the most forceful
terms possible,6" and in language that makes it clear that the
property owner is to be left at least as well off after the condem-
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 36.
63. So great moreover is the regard for the law of private property, that it will
not authorize the least violation of it, no, not even for the general good of the
whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the
grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the
public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent
of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individ-
ual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow
any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of the common
good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is
in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individ-
ual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases
the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel
the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by
absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner, but by
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sus-
tained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individ-
ual for an exchange. All that the legislatuie does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of
power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the
legislature can perform.
I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at * 139.
Note that Blackstone essentially adopts the view that there is no public interest sepa-
rate and apart from the interests of the individuals in society: that is why the public
good is interested essentially in the protection of all private rights. His analysis there-
fore invites the construction of the social interest by Paretian-type rules that compare
social states by showing that all persons are at least as well off in the second state (for
example, after the eminent domain power) than they were in the first state (for exam-
ple, before the power was exercised). Both natural law and utilitarian theories are set in
opposition to collectivist theories of the good that presuppose some objective moral or
political truth.
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nation as before, given that the compensation required is not
for the property taken, but "for the injury thereby sustained."' 4
Other natural law writers of all stripes have also accepted this
principle as one of the foundations of ordinary justice.65 The
compensation requirement turns out to have very powerful
functional roots in a world in which official misconduct or want
of information is the order of the day. The natural lawyers
again had the right principle, for which they did not offer suffi-
cient justification.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted in this paper to give reasons why the battles
between the utilitarian and natural law traditions have been
overstated. In essence .the point is that the types of rights pro-
tected by the natural lawyers, did have powerful functional ex-
planations, many of which were perceived by the writers who
endorsed the rules in question. This connection between utili-
tarian concerns and natural rights theory was stronger in ear--
lier writers than it is in much modern thinking in this branch of
the law, and the divergence of the two traditions is an unfortu-
nate rupture in what should be a powerful intellectual alliance.
Start with the assumption that scarcity in nature breeds self-
interest (with due allowance for the complexities of the family),
and the progression from facts of nature to the laws that gov-
ern human action is not so long or perilous as has sometimes
64. Id. at *139.
The modern caselaw speaks only of the compensation for the property taken, see, e.g.,
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), the result of which
is that all consequential damages, loss of good will, and appraisal fees are today rou-
tinely left uncompensated, see, e.g., United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979);
Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d, 905, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1975). I criticize these cases in R. EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 51-56. Note that
the failure to follow Blackstone's rule has the following allocative distortion. When the
plaintiff's direct loss of property is less than the social gain, which is in turn less than
plaintiff's direct loss plus consequential damages, then the state will take even though
its action will lead to an overall social loss.
65. A passage from Grotius is suggestive:
Mhrough the agency of the king even a right gained by subjects can be taken
from them in two ways, either as a penalty, or by the force of eminent domain.
But in order that this may be done by the power of eminent domain the first
requisite is public advantage; then, that compensation from the public funds
be made, if possible, to the one who has lost his right.
2 H. GRo'rus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES ch. XIV, § VII (F. Kelsey trans.
1925) (1646); see also Gardner v. City of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816);
Grant, The Higher Law Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67, 71
(1931) (noting appeals to Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek).
No. 3] 749
HeinOnline  -- 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y  749 1989
750 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 12
been supposed. The natural law tradition does not have to de-
pend upon bare assertion, intuition or pure reason. It does not
have to insist that rights and duties could be determined by
simple inspection of the external world; it does not have to as-
sume that rights are pre-political in any sense of that term.
What the tradition does try to do is to develop a set of rules,
capable of enforcement at reasonable cost, that allow resources
to be used in ways that hold the greatest promise to advance
the general good, given what we know about human desires
and behavior. In the end the natural law tradition generates
rules of individual autonomy, the family, property, contract,
tort and constitutional governance. We could do far worse.
There are of course hard and doubtful cases within the gen-
eral framework, and I have not pursued those in any depth
here.66 Nonetheless it is now possible to offer an explanation as
to why these hard cases emerge. The basic rules of natural law
operate as a first round of presumptions. 7 They capture much
of what makes sense in a sound legal order. But they do not
exhaust all the possibilities for gain in the structuring of social
institutions. Further refinement is always possible. Within the
framework of the common law, these corrections were typically
achieved by recognizing "excuses" and "justifications" to qual-
ify the basic presumptions of the legal system. The presump-
tion of promise keeping does not rule out the defense of
duress. The prohibition against the use of force does not rule
out force in self-defense.
In principle the process of refinement can continue indefi-
nitely until the presumptions converge on the ideal set of utili-
tarian rules. But the further the process, the less important the
issues, and the greater the scope for honest disagreements over
substantive rules. The strong consensus that people should
keep their promises does not explain what remedy should be
afforded the promisee in an anticipatory breach case, or what
defenses should be given the promisor when the promisee is
also in breach. Typically the debate is over repudiation of the
contract, damages, contract reformation and specific perform-
ance - important issues all, but of a second order nonetheless.
Nor does the social consensus against inflicting harm on stran-
66. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at 114-15 (pointedly criticizing Finnis).
67. See Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 559 (1973) (describing
the operation of the common law system).
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gers say what mix of damages and injunctions are appropriate
to counteract an ordinary nuisance.
There is little reason to be dismayed by the differences that
emerge as the inquiry is pursued. The cases in which the natu-
ral lawyer's intuitions are most in conflict are those in which the
utilitarian calculations are also the most difficult to make. The
market will survive if plaintiffs in anticipatory breach cases must
wait until the day of performance to sue. Property will not per-
ish if the courts reserve some discretion to delay issuing injunc-
tions to minimize minor dislocation of defendants. As the
capacity for formal and empirical analysis increases, we should
expect to see a decline in natural law methodology and rise in
systematic economic thought. As that inquiry unfolds, we can
now be confident of our central conclusion: The natural law-
yers built better than they knew.
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